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REPLY TO D. C. MIRHADY: TORTURE AND RHETORIC IN ATHENS 
THE strong point of D. Mirhady's work (hereafter 'M. ' ) lies in his interpretation of the 
rhetorical handbooks (technai). I agree in general with Part III, though admitting my lack of 
specialist knowledge in this field. To a large extent Part III confirrns my observations on 
procedurallaw published in 1977 (Beweisführung, quoted supra n. 4). I approve of the opinion 
that, despite the use of written rather than oral testimony, the forrnulas, by which the evidence 
was used, did not change (M. after n. 62, see my recent articIe in: Die athenische Demokratie, 
ed. W. Eder [Stuttgart 1995], p. 329 f.) . M. states an appealing hypothesis, that the introduction 
of written testimony did not so much change the procedure as provide the cause for a new 
handbook on rhetoric to be written, which he suggests was the common precursor to Aristotle 
and Anaximenes. The analysis of arguments brought forward for the rejection of the basanos-
challenge proves to be important for the discussion of this special topic. To examine the lines 
of argumentation from Antiphon, Isocrates, Isaios and the early Demosthenes until [Dem.] xlviii 
8 (wh ich has to be taken ironicaIly, n. 75) cannot be the task of a jurist; here we rely on 
interdisciplinary cooperation. Moreover, I have to acknowledge M. 's criticism in n. 64: without 
good reason I tried to exclude proklesis from the atechnoi pisteis. In 1977 I equated the 
atechnoi pisteis with judicial evidence in the modem sense (Bew. 147 f.; despite reservations 
p. 10 n. 4 and p. 316). Now I am convinced that the atechnoi pisteis must be considered from 
the rhetorical rather than the judicial point of view and have to be interpreted merely as written 
documents, for the reading of which the clepsydra in court was stopped. Of course, I too added 
challenges to those 'Prozeßurkunden' (p. 148). Nevertheless my considerations p. 132-48 are 
still to be understood as follows (which will prove important in this discussion): the proklesis-
document itself had no probative force whatsoever and the orators knew this weIl : <'X1wv'ta )'Up 
öau 1tUptxov'tat Eie; 'to öucuaTI]ptov 1tpOKaAOUJlEVOt CtAAflAOue; oi CtVnÖtKOt öta 
Jl.upn>pfac; 1taptxov'tat. 'For alt pieces of evidence v;hich the parties to a suit bring before 
court when they tender challenges to one another, they bring in by means of depositions. " 
([Dem.] Steph. 2, xlvi 4). Those witnesses only testify that one of the litigant parties wanted to 
have a certain statement proved and the other rejected this challenge. The argument of a rejected 
proklesis is one of the cIassical tools of forensic oratory and its practical use should not be 
underestimated. It is this practical use that M. stresses, comparing Aristotle 's AthPol. 53,2-3 to 
Rhet. 1375a24. The enumeration ' Iaws, challenges and testimonies (of witnesses)' in Ath.Pol. 
points to the practical application of evidential documents, whereas the categorization 'laws, 
witnesses, basanoi and oaths' in the Rhet. has to be seen from the argumentative point of view, 
(I believe the contracts cited in Rhet. 1375a24 to be part of the testimonies in Ath.Pol.). 
Undoubtedly the proklesis, especially to basanos, forms the basis of artistically elaborate forensic 
argumentation. Undoubtedly the orators do call this challenge and not only the basanos 'elenchos ' 
(M. refers to Dem. Aph. 3 xxix 11 and On. 1 xxx 27). Still- in the strictly judicial sense-the piece 
of evidence is only the basanos correctly taken and confirmed to the court by witnesses. 
Now we reach the main quest ion that has been discussed for more than a century: is the 
testimony of a tortured slave, the basanos-which is often praised by the orators but apparently 
never used- to be considered a piece of evidence in Athenian procedural law or a means of 
settlement out of court, a trial by ordeal? . 
For wh at follows it might prove useful to repeat the principles of the basanos-procedure that 
are out of dispute. I refer to my resume (Bew. p. 312-15) that has been summarized by M. 
Gagarin in his recent article (CP 91 [1996] 1-18). The procedure of the challenge to basanos 
was controlled by rules that apparently remained constant throughout the century of our 
evidence (c. 420-320). If a litigant wanted to use the testimony of servants, he first issued a 
challenge offering his own or requesting his opponent's slaves for interrogation; rarely slaves 
belonging to a third party were proposed (Ant. vi 23). The challenge would often give specific 
details about when and where the interrogation would occur and exactly wh at questions would 
be asked. The slave's testimony was limited to giving yes-or-no answers to the questions 
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formulated in the challenge which was regularly written down and observed by witnesses. The 
other party could accept or reject the challenge, or accept it with modifications, or make a 
counter-challenge involving different slaves or different conditions. When the two parties had 
reached agreement, the slave was normally interrogated in the owner's presence by the litigant 
who was not his owner; occasionally a third party, referred to as was chosen to 
conduct the interrogation (I am grateful to Prof. Gagarin for letting me use his manuscript). 
Herein we find a primitive mechanism of contral: in the expectation that the slave will testify in 
favour of his master, the opponent is gran ted the right to conduct the torture and decide on its 
duration. Poor slave: if he sticks with his master, the physical pain will increase; if he switches 
sides, his master might take revenge later on. This dilemma was weil known to the ancient 
orators (combine Anaxim. Rhet. Alex. 16,1 and 2; Bew. p. 195 f., p. 288 f.). Gagarin recently 
criticized this mechanism of contral (ep 91 [1996] at n. 51-52): according to Dem. Pant. xxxvii 
40-42 and Isoc. Trap. xvii 15-17 the owner could interrupt the interrogation at any time and 
withdraw his slave. Since the slave's answer never could satisfy both parties, the whole pracedure 
thus praved worthless. Nevertheless, Gagarin fails to notice that in the texts he cites, the basanos-
pracedure has not yet started. When the owner had handed over his slave for torture (para- or 
ekdidonai, Bew. p. 166), he was not allowed to withdraw hirn arbitrarily (Bew. p. 190): it is out 
of the question that the legal conception of a pracedure unanimously esteemed the highest form 
of proof in court should be undermined by such a defect. Therefore I cannot agree with Gagarin 's 
explanation that the basanos formed a Iegitimate piece of evidence that was never used because 
of the room for disagreement on the procedure out of court. We have no evidence for a basanos-
pracedure having begun correctly that was sabotaged by one of the parties. 
Do we now have to return to Headlam's thesis of the basanos being a trial by ordeal out of 
court rat her than a piece of evidence? This thesis seemed to explain why there is no testimony 
delivered by a slave in the forensic speeches- and M. stresses exactly that point. In Bew. p. 205-
14 (§13) I gathered all the texts opposing Headlam's theory that suggest that basanos was 
considered a piece of evidence. In Part 11 M. tries to disprove the conclusions I draw from these 
'direct statements made by the orators' passing over the result of §14 (Bew. p. 214-32). Herein 
I discuss six texts, in which we find an expressively drawn up basanos-challenge regulating the 
way by which the slave's testimony could terminate litigation. This was never done by the act 
of interrogation or by arbitration but in an indirect way. A basanos comprising the intention of 
settling a dispute enacted a discharge (aphesis) or an agreement (homologia) , whereas a simple 
basanos was used as a piece of evidence in court. (Todd [no 4] p. 35 stated recently that a 
basanos, correctly completed, had 'compelling force ' but in my opinion the Athenian 
dikasterion, which took its votes secretely, could not be bound by any evidence, see Bew. p. 
151.) A party which had lost such a decisive basanos, would rate its charices poor in the future 
lawsuit- and would try to avoid it. The litigating parties would have a similar view of their 
chances regarding a basanos without the special c1ause (Bew. p. 232). This- hypothetically 
assumed- conduct of the litigants has to be c1early distinguished from the procedural 
consequences of the basanos. 
Let us now consider M. 's arguments against my conclusions in Bew. § 13. In a first group 
of ni ne texts the speakers want to persuade the dicasts of the fact that- by refusing the basanos -
the opponent tries to suppress definite knowledge. Whether- in this connection--'only the basanos 
or rather already the challenge are called elenchos does not matter from their point of view. The 
speakers- mentioning that the basanos could have released (U1tTlAAUX8at) the opponent- de-
scribe the actual situation and not the legal consequences (for [Dem.] Eu. xlvii 5,7 and 9 see 
Bew. p. 222 f., p. 252-55). In Lys. Tr. iv 11 I would like to stress my conviction that 
refers to the Areopagites. After the subjects bound to be confirmed by basanos were 
enumerated, the defendant addresses his opponents directly- consequently the judges are referred 
to in the third person. In the same way in Ant. Her. v 47 'tou'toum relates to the dicasts. 
The second group of texts calling the basanos- or the challenge-elenchos for witnesses does 
not lead any further. Regarding their situation the speakers have to attach the same importance to 
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a refused challenge as to a successful basanos. The texts M. has cited up to now often use 'good 
knowledge' (EU Ei.8tVat) as an argument, e.g. Ant. Stepmother i 7. There we find 'the good 
knowledge ' quoted from the oath of diomosia swom by the defendant and her son. The same 
'EiMvat ' is uscd in the wording of testimony and for the regulation of the subject in the basanos 
(Bew. p. 1300. The defending step-brother's good knowledge in Ant. Stepmother i 7 relates [0 the 
act of apologein in a lawsuit that was- after an unsuccesssful lege still possible for the 
plaintiff, a1though de facto there was no chance for hirn to win (a7tf]AAaK'tO, Bew. p. 222, 304.). 
I do admit that it is often possible to explain the speaker 's arguments based on the rejection 
of achallenge, as though it would have been possible to settle the dispute by the- now 
refused- basanos, without going to court. This exaggeration is due Lo the special situation. Dem. 
Conon li v 27-29, the last text of the third group (n. 54), is the best proof for the fact that 
according to the laws of procedure the basanos should be presented to the dikaslerion together 
with all the other written documents. It was not achallenge to be worked out in an long-Iasting 
process that might have delayed the sealing of the evidence jars. The proklesis was already 
drawn up (Iiv 29-31), and the names of the slaves had been written down (ypa\jfav'tE<;). Only 
the result of the torture, the basanos, was not yet in the echinos. As an exception to the rule, 
in this speech a speaker fought against an expected argument based on achallenge rejected by 
hirnself (Iiv 27, Bew. p. 252, 262). Although he did not dare to doubt the general probative 
force of the basanos, he constructed his arguments using the formalism of Athenian procedural 
law: the basanos does belong in the echinos! 
Part I of M.'s article starts with a quotation from Pollux viii 62 (n. 7) that is of doubtful 
value. Lexicographers tend to generalize; of course challenges to an oath and to basanos with 
the intention of settling a dispute out of court existed- but also to simple basanos. I do not see 
how Pollux (or M.) imagines out of court termination of a dispute by means of marturia 
(testimony in court). Does he think of challenge to an oath swom by the witness? This source 
is worthless because of its vagueness. 
The great importance of the challenge-justly pointed out by M.- can be understood easily by 
correctly c1assifiying the basanos within procedural law, rather than by using Headlam's 
simplifying theory. Having reached agreement, both litigant parties co-operated in the basanos-
procedure, so that the result- the testimony delivered by a slave-was theoretically of very high 
reputation. The crux is the agreement. Only a litigant confident in his advantage will enter into 
a basanos and in this case the opponent will try to avoid it. Without further exposition, I would 
like to presume that the basanos could only work in a system where the judicial magistrates had 
the possibility to force one litigant to enter into an action proposed by the opponent. If these 
conditions are assumed, basanos as weil as a terminating oath can be called an ordeal (supposed 
in Bew. p. 307). In this sense, and restricted to the archaic period, but not 'to undergo fire' (n. 26) 
I take Headlam's observations for an important contribution. Considering democratic Athens there 
cannot have been coercion to the basanos. The testimony of a slave is a piece of evidence like 
many others. Left 10 the Iitigants, the elaborate bi partite procedure formed the legal basis for the 
risky game with the ' unacceptable challenge'. Still this 'game' often enough meant a fight for life. 
I believe that the esteem for the basanos comes from an earlier period. The procedure is 
simple enough to appeal to every Athenian even without seeing it performed. Rejecting a 
challenge with unfavourable preconditions was natural. But why do we never read that a 
challenge that was accepted as fair by both led to a basanos-procedure? The answer 
might be easy: masters and servants lived in different worlds. It was unworthy for an Athenian 
citizen to rely on the answer of a slave in an important matter. The epilogue to Lys. Tr. iv 
shows this mentality, although the passage does not refer directly to the basanos mentioned 
before (iv 19): ayavaK'tw ö', ro ßouAf] , Ei öux 1t6pvTlV Kat ÖODATIV (Xv8pü)1tov 1tEpt 'twv 
f.!EyiO"'tWV Ei<; Kfvöuvov Ka8tO"'tT\Ka, ... ' I am vexed, gentlemen, al jinding myself in danger 
of losing what 1 value mosl 0/1 account of a harlot and a slave' . 
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